Summary. This paper analyzes an exchange economy in which several assets serve as stores of value and where agents have completely heterogeneous preferences and endowments. It describes the set of perfect foresight equilibria in which all assets have positive prices. There are international policies with determinate exchange rates if the world economy satisfies a strong efficiency criterion. Also, the corresponding equilibrium allocations are in the core of the world economy for certain international policies. Hence, a system of fixed exchange rates can support efficient allocations to the extent that countries agree on a division of seigniorage in the creation of international reserves.
Introduction
One of the most celebrated results in the theory of international finance is that the equilibrium exchange rate is indeterminate in models of overlapping generations with several assets. Using a stationary model, Kareken and Wallace [19] showed that for any exchange rate there was a unique equilibrium in which all currencies and goods traded freely and that each exchange rate had real effects. ~ The purpose of this paper is to develop this insight more deeply; using Malinvaud's [21] strong criterion, we explore the relationship between exchange rates and the efficiency of equilibrium allocations in a wide class of economies.
Most analyses of dynamic efficiency focus on a sequence of homogeneous agents, but economies with one representative agent per generation miss the essence of international economics: trade between countries. Of course, allocations are efficient if and only if: (i) there is no feasible reallocation among the agents of any one generation that makes one person better off without hurting any other; and (ii) there is no such feasible reallocation between the agents of different generations.
The primary contribution of this paper is that, for certain configurations of country-specific generational deficits, considerations of economic efficiency eliminate the generic multiplicity of exchange rates. By imposing a strong efficiency criterion, we show that one vector of exchange rates suffices for dynamic efficiency when countries run disparate generational deficits. A surprising implication of this analysis is that some exchange rates support allocations that are in the core of the world economy. Thus my analysis gives the first rigorous theoretical justification of Mundell's [22] classic observation about a system of fixed exchange rates, and I show why it is in the interest of one government to sacrifice its own policy independence. Moreover, the efficiency criterion I analyze can be tested empirically by checking whether countries in a system of fixed exchange rates have stocks of national (generational) debt whose present values are co-integrated,
Here is the intuition. Consider a world economy with a fixed stream of endowments and a given profile of national generational deficits. Different exchange rates give rise to different real values of generational deficits and real interest rates. Not every such profile supports an efficient consumption path. As we shall see below, exchange rates that divide the seigniorage from the creation of international reserves help ensure the dynamic efficiency of the world economy.
The model here is based upon that developed in Fisher [14] , which is in turn an extension of the model developed by Balasko and Shell [5] and [6] . Agents have completely heterogeneous endowments and preferences; hence, agents differ across countries as well as through time. There are no restrictions on trade in goods or assets at any time. To the best of my knowledge, this is the most general model of overlapping generations that has been used in international finance. 2 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the model. The third section characterizes equilibria with international generational policies, and the fourth describes aspects of the relationship between exchange rates and economic efficiency. The fifth section gives two examples of international economies where determinate exchange rates divide the gains from trade, and the sixth section presents my conclusions and an agenda for future empirical research.
The model
I extend the fundamental papers of Balasko and Shell [5] and [6] by assuming that there are several agents in each generation, with each agent living for two periods) The agents alive at the beginning of the economy live for only one period. Goods z There has been almost no literature on dynamic efficiency in international economics, although Buiter [9] is a notable exception. Still, most research using overlapping generations in international economics has been accomplished with diagrammatic analysis or with analytical solutions to simple difference equations. Hence, it has concentrated exclusively on stationary economies. 3 The fact that these agents live for only two periods is not as restrictive as it seems. Balasko, Cass, and Shell [4] give an algorithm for transforming an arbitrary model of overlapping generations into the one we use here by a labeling convention on dated commodities. Benveniste [8] is careful to explain that this algorithm has implications for how one might define the inter-temporal efficiency condition. cannot be stored, and at least two fiat assets serve as a store of value. Agents have heterogeneous preferences and endowments, and g goods are available in each period. Each agent has smooth, convex, and monotone preferences, and the closure of her indifference surfaces are contained in the positive orthant of ~-dimensional or 2~%dimensional Euclidean space. Further, each agent is endowed with strictly positive amounts of every good in each period of her life, and she may receive taxes or transfers from different fiscal authorities. 4 The set of people born at time t is G~, and N t = #G t < Go. Then
is the index set of agent in the world economy. A list of countries is a partition of this set. There are ~ > 2 different countries, each with its own fiat asset. Let = { G 1 .... , G ~'} partition G; then agent hE G ~ is a resident of the j-th (and only the j-th) country. The set agents alive at time t is G t ~ G t_ 1, and he G j c~ G~ is a resident of country j born at time t. Although the world population may vary from period to period, there is always an agent trading with another person who will survive her. I will call the m fiscal authorities governments.
It will be convenient to represent commodity bundles, prices, and government policies as sequences. The allocation of agent h~G~ is Since there is more than one country, the description of lump-sum transfers is more complicated than the usual case. Let m~ 'i be agent h's receipts of fiat asset j at time t; if inks<0, then agent h is taxed in asset j at time t. For h~G o, let An international policy is the full list m = (mh)h~ 6. Note that we are considering policies that give all types of assets to all kinds of people. The agents in the world economy can create as many inside assets of any denomination as they may please. Let y~'J be the gross additions at time t to the type-j assets ofh~Gt, with y~EN ~ the corresponding vector. I impose that y~ _> 0 for h~G o and y~,+y~--1 > 0 for h~G k G o. These vector-valued inequalities state that no one can die a net debtor in any asset and no one holds assets when she is not alive. Again Yh = (0,..., y~, y~+ 1, 0,...).
represents the incremental asset holdings of agent he G r I consider the set of perfectly foreseen present value commodity prices with the normalization pl,1 = 1. A sequence of goods prices is p = (pl,p2 .... ) where pteR~++ and p e~, the set of present-value prices. Then pi,~/pt,i is commodity i's own rate of interest between periods 1 and t. Let q"~ > 0 be the price of type-j assets at time t, and let q'e~r + be the vector of all m such prices. 5 The sequence of such prices is q = ( q l , q 2 .... ) and qe..~, the set of present-value asset prices. Since the price of each asset is strictly positive, any bilateral exchange rate is well defined. Moreover, asset prices are not otherwise restricted because no further normalization is warranted without loss of generality in the analysis below.
Agent h~G k G 0 has utility function � 9 2~e u h. ~ + ~ ~ and maximizes: 6 t t+l
Uh(Xh, X h )
(1) subject to
Xh>_O, and y~+y~+l>_0,7
where w h is the present value of her wealth, including the taxes and transfers that accrue during the course of her life. All of these inner products are well defined because only finitely many elements of x h, Yh, COh, and m h are not zero. Define the aggregate supply of type-j assets in period t as: Condition (ii) describes material balances; it is an infinite-dimensional vectorinequality stating that aggregate demand for each dated commodity not exceed aggregate supply. Condition (iii) describes equilibrium in asset markets; it too is an infinite-dimensional inequality describing the demand for the stocks of assets and their supplies.
We now state our first proposition. 
Proof:
The fact that all present value asset prices are constant follows from Balasko and Shell E6, Proposition 3.1]. Note that the exchange rate of currency k in terms of currency j is e t'k'j = q~,k/qtd. Since qt,~ > 0 for all t and j, the Proposition follows. [] Proposition 1 states that each nominal exchange rate is constant; this is an implication of a perfect foresight equilibrium. The normalization that p l , a = 1 entails that the present value of an exchange rate is constant; hence, uncovered interest parity holds. 8 Proposition 1 does not imply that real exchange rates are constant. The definition of a real exchange rate in a model this general would entail a price index of traded and not-traded goods for each of the different countries. 9 Only by a fluke would such an index be constant for any one country.
Proposition 1 defines ~ (~-1 ) bilateral exchange rates. Since qO,j/qO,k= e Lk = lie k'j, not all of these exchange rates are independent. Indeed, using arguments involving triangular arbitrage, one can show that only m -1 of these exchange rates are independent. We have set up a rich enough structure to analyze the central theoretical issue of this paper.
Equilibria with international generational policies
In this section, we shall show how equilibrium in the goods market depends upon the generational policies adopted by all countries. The intuition is that a government increases the purchasing power of those to whom it gives lump-sum transfers, as long as its expansion is not so egregious as to destroy the value of its fiat asset.
Let p E~, and recall that the present value of agent h's wealth is:
Again, these expressions are well defined because only finitely m a n y elements of COh and m a are not-zero. Since asset prices are constants, the present value of h's wealth depends only u p o n the sum of transfers that he receives. It is convenient to define:
Of course, #h e R ~ is the vector of transfers accruing to agent h. Let #~ = (#~)h~G be the generational policy ofcountryj.1 o The conventional measure of a government deficit is derived from (mt J, mt+l'J)heG , but the real effect of government j's policy is determined by #J = (/~)h~G. An international generational policy is a list of m different sequence # = {#1 .... ,/~..z}. Let J// be the set of such policies. These policies are general enough so that countries m a y tax or subsidize every he G. 11 N o w let 6~= { ( p , q ) l p e~ and qe~}, and recall q t = q t + l = q 0 in a perfect foresight equilibrium. The d e m a n d of h at time t is a function f~: 9 ~ x N+ ~ Rt+, derived as the solution to (1) for a given p e 9 ~ and w h = P'COh q-qO't2he ~+" Then
describes h's demands. The material balances condition is:
h~G h~G
This vector inequality is infinite-dimensional, and each of its elements is well defined because only finitely m a n y of the elements of fh(P, % ) and co h are not zero and N t =-# G t is finite for all t. N o w let 6e(co,/z) denote the set of perfect foresight equilibrium prices supporting some equilibrium consistent with the endowments coeX and international genera- lo This is the terminology of Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff [2] . It is important for both theoretical and empirical reasons. By now it is well known that the conventional government deficit is not well defined. Moreover, any econometric test based on the Theorems below must recognize that generational, not conventional, deficits determine the dynamic efficiency of the equilibrium allocations in the world economy. I am actually interested in describing the properties of 5P(co, #), but it is not at all easy to determine whether this set is empty in a model this general. That is why we use the concept of a price-income equilibrium. If # = 0 trivially, then there is enough structure on this economy to show that there is an equilibrium. Since no agent's wealth is affected by the prices of the different assets for any q~ +, (p,q)ss ~ZL In general, it is not possible to describe 5r explicitly; instead, we show below that special generational policies # e , # are consistent with a price-income equilibria (p, w) whose allocations are efficient. Then we explore the circumstances under which one vector of exchange rates suffices to guarantee the efficiency of these allocations.
Equilibrium exchange rates
Consider the world economy (co, p) and assume that Y(co,#)r Let QO(co.#) __ N2 + be the set of all asset prices giving rise to some (p,q)ESP(co,#).
QO(co, #) is not empty because 5P(co, #) r ~Z~. We are interested in the dimension of QO(co,/0; if dim Q(co, ~) > 1, then there are several vectors of the m -i independent exchange rates that are consistent with some perfect foresight competitive equilibrium. Kareken and Wallace have already shown that the exchange rate is indeterminate for the Samuelsonian equilibria in one class of stationary economies.
Let qO~QO(co, #).
Then it is easy to recover the m -1 independent exchange rates by the function g: QO _~ {1} x ~'; + whose rule is:
... , qO,~/qO,1).
We are particularly interested in whether Q~ #) is contained in a one-dimensional linear sub-space of R% § in which case the exchange rates in the world economy are determinate. Even though the equilibrium exchange rates are constant, the vector of exchange rates influences equilibrium allocations in two ways. First, exchange rates have effects on the distribution of consumption within each generation. Second, they re-allocate consumption between generations.
We state now a proposition concerning the first effect. 
Wh = p.o) h + qO "#h = P'O3h + (qO § ~)'#h = P'(~h § (qO § 2~).#h
for some 2 > 0 . Since q~ there is a continuum of 2 > 0 such that (qO + 2e)e Re; + and qO + 2e is consistent with (p, w). Hence, dim Q~ #) > 1. [] Consider an economy with red and blue assets. Each agent receives a tax or transfer imposed in strict proportions of one red note and one blue note. Since p 1,1 = 1, the num6rarire might well be a pound of sterling silver at time 1 (1699, say, when Sir Isaac Newton became master of the mint). Then it does not matter if the red note is worth three pounds sterling and the blue note seven or if both notes are worth five pounds sterling. The exchange rate is entirely indeterminate since dim Q~ #) --2.
When will the elements of # be linearly independent? One common assumption in international economics is that each agent receives transfers in only one currency. Then the elements of # are certainly linearly independent and exchange rates affect the distribution of resources within each generation. Another possibility is a representative-agent model with disparate patterns of currency transfers. Then exchange rates influence the rate of increase of asset balances in the world economy.
In exploring inter-temporal efficiency in the rest of this paper, we will impose
Postulating that lim inft~ oo 11 pt 11 = 0 entails that every commodity's own-rate of interest is eventually positive. If world resources are uniformly bounded, then interest rates are greater than the long-run growth rate of the world economy. We now state our first important result. 
P t ' [ h~ fh(P, h)],,,,,P [ ,~f h ( P , h)]H }

< [Ipt'rtll < I]rtH Ilptll <gllptN.
Since l i m i n f~l l p t l l = O , liminft~o~]q~
Since Q~ is not empty, [16] called the "classical case" and the present value of the stock of the world generational debt is retired asymptotically.13 It is important to emphasize that these kinds of equilibria do permit positive stocks of generational debt in each period in the world economy, although some agent must be taxed eventually in order to amortize the international generational debt. Thus, if A # 0~N '~, Theorem 1 imposes a linear restriction on the set of asset prices ~~ p). It does not state that Q~ t0 lies in a one-dimensional sub-space of N'; +, but dynamic efficiency implies that exchange rates lie in a linear sub-space of N'; + whose dimension is no greater than ~n -2. Hence exchange rates are not entirely indeterminate.
The next concept illustrates some interesting implications of Theorem 1.
Definition 3: #J is frequently balanced if and only if lim inf,_ ~ A tJ = O.
This is akin to the terminology of Balasko and Shell [7] . If a generational policy is not frequently balanced, then a country's debt or surplus is permanent. The beauty of a model with m > 2 assets is that there may be several elements of/~, none of which is frequently balanced, and yet lira inf~_,~o [g(qO)].A ~ = 0. We state: Assume that there is a perfect foresight equilibrium that supports efficient allocations. If one government conducts an expansionary generational policy, then the other must conduct a contractionary one, and the exchange rate is determinate) r The latter government keeps asset balances within appropriate bounds for world economy. This argument has the flavor of Mundell's classic redundancy argument [22] ; one fiscal authority "sacrifices" its independence in order to keep the equilibrium allocations of all agents in the world economy efficient. In a system of fixed exchange rates, one country must run generational surpluses if some country runs a policy that is not frequently balanced.
Corollary 1.1: Consider a world with two countries. Assume that there is a uniform bound on world resources and that (p, q)~CJ(o9, I~) # (2~ satisfies lim inf,_. ~o f[ pt l[ = O. Then: (/) f l i m inft_~ ~ A t'~ > O, then lira inft_~ ~ A t'2 < 0; and (ii) / f l i m t . ~ A t'I # 0 and
It is important to emphasize the intuition behind Corollary 1.1. An expansionary government creates too great an asymptotic supply of asset balances. If the other government did not "lean against the wind," then the equilibrium would not be efficient. Since there is free trade in all goods and assets, it is inappropriate to conclude that there is too much of any one asset; the problem is that there is too much of all types of assets unless another government corrects this imbalance.
Following Chae and Esteban [12] , we define another helpful concept. A coalition is a non-empty subset S___ G, the index set of agents. An assignment is a list of consumption bundles x = (Xh)h~ o, which may or may not be feasible. Then, for any coalition S and assignment x e X , = Iv~X: ~, z h = v for some assignment z such that
Uh(Zh) > Uh(Xh) for all h~S and Uh(Zh) > Uh(Xh) for some heS t denotes the set of resources that can be distributed among the members of S such that no member of S is worse off and at least one member of S is strictly better off than is the case under the assignment x. Recall that co h is the endowment of agent h. We now state: Of course, an allocation x e X is in the core if it cannot be improved upon by any coalition. ~ 5 In the examples given below, we show that there are equilibria where countries run trade surpluses in order to maintain access to international capital markets. Even though there is imbalanced trade, the equilibrium allocations in the world economy Pareto-dominate autarky.
In fully dynamic international economies, there are two natural coalitions that might arise. The first is the set of agents in a generation, and the second is the full sequence of agents constituting a country. This observation allows us to state a deep concomitant of Theorem 1. is Hendricks, Judd, and Kovenock [ 17] gave the first example of Walrasian equilibrium allocations not in the (empty) core in a model of overlapping generations. Kovenock [20] showed that there are Pareto-optimal Walrasian equilibrium allocations not in the (empty) core. Esteban and Mi11/m [13] showed that there are Pareto-optimal Walrasian equilibrium allocations in an economy whose core is not empty. The assumption that there is one good per period places this result firmly within the literature on aggregative economics. Consider now a world economy with a non-empty core. Assume that one country creates such a large asymptotic supply of its asset that the equilibrium allocations are not Pareto efficient. Then the countries in the world economy could agree on a different array of generational policies enhancing the distributive efficiency of the world economy. Such an agreement would be self-enforcing because the vector of exchange rates and the new policy support equilibrium allocations in the core of the world economy.
There are world economies in which countries are willing to run generational surpluses in order to maintain access to international capital markets. This fact is at the essence of why a country would "sacrifice its policy independence" and run an external surplus. A surplus country maintains the dynamic efficiency of the world economy because access to the international trading system allows for a Pareto improvement over the allocations that it could achieve without international financial markets! Much of the literature on the core in a model of overlapping generations has been concerned with convergence of the core to the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Chae [11] and Aliprantis and Burkinshaw [1] are two important examples. But most important theoretical issues in international economics arise precisely because countries are atoms. Hence, in natural applications in international economics, the core of the world economy may be much larger than the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. This insight will be exploited in the examples below.
If the stream of world resources is uniformly bounded, the Malinvaud criterion implies that (q~176176 has an accumulation point at zero. If there were only one 
Applications
The first example describes a world economy consisting of two countries with identical preferences but different endowments. International trade benefits benefits both countries, and there is a unique exchange rate that divides the gains from trade between the two countries.
